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SS EX REL. K.B.D. V. DREW: THE FAILURE TO ALIGN
BIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PATERNITY—WHEN CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ISN’T ENOUGH
Chelsea Gomez ∗
I. BACKGROUND
The case of State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services
ex rel. K.B.D. v. Drew 1 required the Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal to determine whether a presumed father, under
Louisiana Civil Code article 185, could successfully file a petition
to disavow paternity more than five years after the birth of his
presumed child by providing clear and convincing evidence that he
was not the biological father of the child. 2 Particularly, the court
was asked to determine whether a presumed father could
successfully disavow paternity when he had no reason to question
paternity until four years after the child’s birth.
After becoming pregnant out of wedlock, the mother of K.B.D.
married her boyfriend, Marion Drew, Jr., in December 2003. Six
months later, on June 14, 2004, the child was born of the marriage,
and the husband signed the certificate of live birth. The husband
filed for divorce more than four years later. At this point, he never
questioned the biological paternity of the child. After the state filed
a rule to establish support on behalf of the minor child in April
2008, 3 the husband acquired knowledge that the mother might
∗ Candidate, J.D./D.C.L., 2013, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. The author would like to thank Professors John Randall Trahan
and Olivier Moréteau for their guidance throughout the writing of this Case
Note.
1. 46,337, (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/11); 70 So. 3d 1011.
2. Id. at 1012.
3. Id. at 1011, n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 and 608) “. . .recipients of
AFDC under Title IV D of the Social Security Act assign their child support
rights to the state and are required to cooperate (unless good cause for refusing
to do so is determined to exist) in whatever legal action the state undertakes. By
assigning their child support rights in return for AFDC aid, they give the states
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have slept with another man around the time of conception. In June
2008, the presumed father requested DNA testing, which
ultimately determined that he was not the biological father. In July
2009, he filed a petition to annul his acknowledgment and in
October 2009 amended his petition to disavow paternity. This suit
was brought more than four years after the birth and more than a
year after questioning filiation.
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A divided court 4 upheld the legal presumption of paternity and
dismissed the father’s disavowal action as prescribed, with a
concurring opinion advocating for the application of contra non
valentem when a father, such as the presumptive father in the
instant case, was not informed of the possibility that the baby could
have been fathered by another man. 5 In its legal analysis, the
majority quickly disposed of the petition in which the presumed
father attempted to annul his acknowledgement of paternity. 6 He
alleged that Louisiana Revised Statute 9:392(A)(7)(b) allowed him
to annul his acknowledgment because he was able to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he was not the biological
father. 7 The court, however, recognized that the acknowledgment
referred to is not that which can be accomplished by the signing of
the birth certificate at the time of birth, but rather that which can be
accomplished by the execution of an authentic act of
acknowledgment or by the subsequent signing of the birth
certificate. 8 As the court correctly noted, the presumed father in
this case had not made such an acknowledgment. In addition, the

the opportunity to recoup the financial drain imposed by the welfare system on
the state and federal treasuries.”
4. Id. at 1016 (Judge Stewart concurring in a separate opinion).
5. Id. at 1015, 1016.
6. Id. at 1014.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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court noted, even if the father had made such an acknowledgment
and even if it were to have been annulled, the outcome of the case
would not have been changed: the child was born of the marriage;
therefore, the presumption of paternity created by Civil Code
article 185 was valid without any acknowledgment required. 9
The court relied on Louisiana Civil Code articles 185 and 189
in deciding this dispute.10 Article 185 states, “The husband of the
mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the
marriage or within three hundred days from the date of the
termination of the marriage.” 11The husband and presumed father
may rebut this presumption by bringing a “disavowal action.”12
This action is further governed by the one year liberative
prescription period of Louisiana Civil Code Article 189, which
provides that prescription commences from the day the husband
learns of, or should have learned of the birth of the child. 13 The
only exception provided is if the husband and mother continuously
lived separate and apart during the three hundred days preceding
the birth. 14 In that case, prescription does not begin to run until the
husband is notified in writing that someone has asserted he is the
child’s father. 15
The court recognized that the presumed father’s testimony, the
mother’s testimony, and the DNA results successfully proved, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he was not the biological
father, thus, meeting the requirements of Louisiana Civil Code
article 187 for a successful disavowal action. 16 Regardless of such
proof, the language of article 189 is clear and unambiguous—
prescription should start on the date the presumed father learned or

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 1012-1013.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2011).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2011).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1013; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2011).
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should have learned of the birth. 17 Though the prescriptive period
may be subject to the doctrine of contra non valentem, 18 the court
recognized that the presumed father, under these circumstances,
clearly knew that the child was born on the date of birth, which
disallowed interruption or suspension of the prescriptive period. 19
Therefore, by the time the complaint was filed in the instant
matter, the cause of action had prescribed. Under this analysis, the
majority of the Second Circuit seems willing to apply the doctrine
of contra non valentem only if the father has no reason to know
about the actual birth, not in cases where he had no reason to
question the biological paternity until a later date. Though this
reasoning is consistent with the public policy to “protect innocent
children, born during the marriage,” the doctrine would be
unnecessary in such circumstances. 20 If the husband has no reason
to know of the birth of the child, article 189 already provides for
interruption of prescription until he should have learned of the
birth. 21 Although the court states that contra non valentem could
be applied to this prescriptive period, its reasoning rejecting its
application seemingly bars the doctrine from use in disavowal
suits.
The Second Circuit recognized that the changes made in 2005
to the law of filiation liberalize the strict nature of the
presumptions, more closely aligning biological and legal
17. LA. CIV. CODE Ann. art. 189 (2011).
18. See Corsey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 132122 (recognizing that “Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized a limited
exception [to the running of prescription] where in fact and for good cause a
plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues” The Court also
recognizes that this “principle is often denoted by the maxim Contra non
valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio” and is “especially applicable in the
present instance, where the plaintiff's inability to act is due to the defendant's
willful or negligent conduct.”); Benjamin West Janke and François-Xavier
Licari, Contra Non Valentem in France and Louisiana: Revealing the
Parenthood, Breaking a Myth, 71 LA. L. REV. 503 (explaining the relationship
between the Louisiana and French courts’ treatment of the extra-codal principle
of contra non valentem in prescription law).
19. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1014.
20. Id. at 1015.
21. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2011).
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paternity. 22 These changes make the presumption more easily
rebuttable, including changing the period to disavow from
peremptive to prescriptive and extending an action of contestation
to the mother of the child. 23 However, the court states that the
unambiguous prescription period must govern, and prescription
was deemed to have run. Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed
the grant of the state’s exception of prescription. 24 This reasoning
is in stark contrast with the concurring opinion. Judge Stewart’s
separate concurring opinion advocates for the application of contra
non valentem, a doctrine standing for the “proposition that
prescription does not run against those who cannot act.” 25
Louisiana courts allow contra non valentem to apply and prevent
the running of liberative prescription when the “cause of action is
not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff.” 26 Judge
Stewart states that this doctrine should be applicable “in matters
like this one, where the mother withheld information” and
“prevented him from availing himself of the disavowal action.” 27
In particular, the mother never informed the presumed father that
she was still sexually involved with her ex-boyfriend at the time of
conception. 28 Whereas the majority seemingly would never apply
contra non valentem to a disavowal action, Judge Stewart
recommends this doctrine be applied when the mother withholds
information necessary for the presumed father to avail himself to
his cause of action.
III. COMMENTARY
The Second Circuit majority decision in SS ex rel. K.B.D. v.
Drew reinforces the notion that the presumption of paternity found
22. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1013-1015.
23. Id. at 1014.
24. Id. at 1013-1015.
25. Id. at 1017.
26. Id. (citing Corsey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrections, 375 So. 2d
13139, 1321-22 (La. 1979)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1016.
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in Louisiana Civil Code article 185 is one of the strongest
presumptions in Louisiana law. 29 Regardless of the ability to
determine biological paternity with practical certainty (i.e. using
advances in technology and science such as DNA testing), the
decision strictly enforces the prescriptive period set forth in article
189. The court explained its holding by recognizing the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s explanation of the purpose of the presumption
stating, “The action to disavow is to protect innocent children, born
during marriage, against scandalous attacks upon their paternity by
the husband;” because of this important purpose, the presumption
should be zealously guarded and enforced. 30 However, under the
facts provided in the case, it was clear, through testimony, that the
mother knew the identity of the other man she engaged in sexual
intercourse with, making it possible to find and impose liability on
the biological father for the support of his child.
The policy questions raised by Judge Stewart’s concurring
opinion are especially noteworthy. Particularly, he recognizes that
this decision requires a man to support a non-biological child while
the known, although absent biological father “escapes financial
responsibility.” 31 The majority does say that contra non valentem
could be applied to disavowal actions, but its discussion of the
doctrine would likely lead to confusion in lower courts when
applying this doctrine to similar disputes. The court merely
recognizes its potential application, recognizes that the Plaintiff
clearly knew of the child’s birth and believed at this time that it
was his biological child, and that there was no question of filiation
until almost four years later. 32 There is no further explanation as to
exactly why the doctrine should not apply. The court’s explanation
seemingly hinges on the fact that the presumed father clearly knew
29. See, e.g., Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 So. 2d 619 (La. 1972); Williams v.
Williams, 87 So. 2d 707 (La. 1956).
30. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1015 (citing Gallo v. Gallo, 03-0794 (La. 12/3/03);
861 So. 2d 168).
31. Id. at 1016.
32. Id. at 1014.
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of the birth, and that the prescription period is unambiguous.
However, Judge Stewart’s recommendation to remedy this
situation seems reasonable—to apply contra non valentem in
matters, such as the present case, where the mother withheld
information, thereby making it impossible for the father to
“reasonably know” of his possible cause of action. 33 Today, this
seems especially reasonable with the availability of DNA
technology, allowing for biological and legal paternity to be more
closely aligned without violating the strong public policy in favor
of providing child support. Until there is clarification in the Second
Circuit’s application of contra non valentem, the prescriptive
period for disavowal actions will likely be strictly enforced to
protect children born of a marriage.
Another potential remedy for this apparent inequity would be
to extend the policy embedded in the Louisiana Civil Code
provisions on the designation of “dual paternity” 34 to
circumstances similar to those in the instant case—when a legal
father is deceived by the mother and there is a known biological
father. Civil Code article 198 would seemingly be the most
relevant statement of law, capable of application through analogy
to the instant situation.35 This article allows a biological father to
establish paternity even if the child has a presumed father. 36 The
action to designate a biological father when a presumed father
exists is typically limited by a one-year peremptive period,
commencing at the time of birth of the child. However, the
33. Id. at 1017.
34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197, 198 (2011).
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2011); “A man may institute an action to
establish his paternity of a child at any time except as provided in this Article.
The action is strictly personal. If the child is presumed to be the child of another
man, the action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth of
the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child
regarding his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the
day the father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within ten years
from the day of the birth of the child, whichever first occurs. In all cases, the
action shall be instituted no later than one year from the day of the death of the
child. The time periods in this Article are peremptive.”
36. Id.
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legislature provides a limited application of contra non valentem in
circumstances of the mother’s deception of the biological father. 37
Specifically, the action may be instituted within one year from
when the biological father knew or should have known of his
paternity, but at the latest, within ten years of the child’s birth.
Applying a similar contra non valentem period for the presumed
father would not defy the policy in favor of child support as long
as appropriate safeguards are followed—as long as a known
biological father exists and may be held liable for support. Since
dual paternity is already recognized in Louisiana, the legislature
could at least allow courts to designate dual paternity in these
narrow instances of deception of the presumed father. In these
cases, courts could then adopt the process already recognized for
setting child support in dual paternity cases designated under Civil
Code articles 197 and 198. 38 Doing so would not only ensure
support for the child, but would also coincide with the policy
argument recognized in the Reed case. In particular, the court
stated, “the biological father does not escape his support
obligations merely because others may share with him the
responsibility. Biological fathers are civilly obligated for the
support of the offspring.” 39 In sum, with the proper legislative
safeguards, there is no reason to continue requiring presumed
fathers to be solely liable to support a child with a known
biological father when the mother intentionally deceived the
presumed father about the conception of the child. Especially with
modern DNA testing, there should be action taken to better align
legal and biological paternity.
37. Id.
38. See State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services ex rel. P.B. v.
Reed, 10-410 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/10); 52 So. 3d 145 (requiring both the
presumed and biological father to provide support to the child because it was
found to be within the child’s best interest; and also requiring the child support
guidelines to be followed, with each party providing to the court a verified
income statement showing gross income and adjusted gross income, together
with documentation of current and past earnings).
39. Id. at 147.

